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A Matter of Conscience: United States v.
Seeger and the Supreme Court's Historical
Failure to Define Conscientious Objector
Status Under the First Amendment
by CLAIRE MARBLESTONE*

Protection of religious liberty is an important American value.
Even in times of war, Congress has consistently protected religious
The history of
devotees from participation in military service
conscientious objectors in the United States is unique because the
First Amendment prohibits an establishment of religion and
guarantees the free exercise of religion. However, the Supreme
Court has yet to address whether the First Amendment affords any
protections for conscientious objectors to military service.
The Vietnam War was a pivotal period for conscientious
objectors! Between 1965 and 1973, a military draft was in full effect,
and applications for conscientious objector status significantly
increased.4 During this time, the leading Supreme Court case
addressing conscientious objectors was United States v. Seegers In
* J.D. Candidate 2011, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A.
magna cum laude, 2008, History, University of California, Santa Barbara. The author
would like to thank Professor David Faigman for his guidance and insight, Ron and
Deirdre Marblestone for their unconditional love and support, and Jeff Lamb for being
her biggest champion.
1. Note, The Conscientious Objector and the First Amendment: There But for the
Grace of God, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 79,79 (1966).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .").
3. STEPHEN M. KOHN, JAILED FOR PEACE: THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN DRAFT
LAW VIOLATORS, 1658-1985, 93 (1987) (citing the U.S. Bureau of Census, Historical
Statistics of the United States (1975) and the Selective Service System, Conscientious
Objectors Special Monograph No. 11, 53, 314-15).
4. Id.
5. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165 (1965). The next Supreme Court
decision addressing the qualifications for conscientious objectors was Welsh v. United
[201]
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Seeger, the Court attempted to define the kinds of religious beliefs
that qualify for a conscientious objector exemption from military
Instead of addressing whether conscientious objectors
service.'
deserve protection under the First Amendment, the Court chose to
interpret the applicable conscientious objector statute in an overly
broad manner in order to avoid addressing any constitutional issues.!
This Note argues that the Court should have confronted the
constitutional questions presented in Seeger because the traditional
reasons for invoking the doctrine of avoidance did not justify issuing a
weak test for lower courts and administrative agencies to administer.
Initially, a discussion of conscientious objectors to military
service may appear irrelevant because the draft has ended and the
military currently consists of an all volunteer force.! However, if the
President chose to do so, the draft could quickly be reinstated.! In
2003, members of the House of Representatives proposed military
conscription legislation if the United States declared war on Iraq."o
American troops have been in Iraq for seven years, and there is an
increased need for troops in Afghanistan." Military recruiters have
had a difficult time meeting their recruitment goals since the
beginning of the Iraq war. 12 President Barack Obama has not
indicated that the draft will be reinstated. However, a fatigued
military, extensive U.S. military deployments around the world, and
declining military recruits could force Congress to reinstate
conscription." If a draft is reinstated, Congress would be forced to
address whether to exempt conscientious objectors from military
States in 1970. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970). The Court also addressed
conscientious objectors in Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
6. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 173-85.
7. Id. at 166. See also Howard R. Lurie, Conscientious Objection: The Constitutional
Questions, 73 W. VA. L. REV. 138, 144 (1971); United States v. Levy, 419 F.2d 360, 365
(8th Cir. 1969).
8. Matthew G. Lindenbaum, Note, Religious Conscientious Objection and the
Establishment Clause in the Rehnquist Court: Seeger, Welsh, Gillette and §6(j) Revisited,
36 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBs. 237, 239 (2003).
9. Id. The Code of Federal Regulations contains provisions for the induction of
registered males to be used in the event that the draft is reinstated. 32 CFR §§ 1624.11624.10 (2010). These provisions include conscientious objector exemptions to military
service. Id.
10. Lindenbaum, supra note 8, at 239.
11. Katherine Shaver, Antiwar March in D.C. Draws Thousands, WASHINGTON
POST, Mar. 21, 2010, at A3.
12. Lizette Alvarez, More Americans Joining Military as Jobs Dwindle, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 19, 2009, at Al.
13. Id.
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service. The prospect of a continuous global war on terror compels a
reconsideration of the constitutionality of conscientious objectors.
Supreme Court jurisprudence relating to conscientious objectors
is unsettled. The Court has yet to address whether the First
Amendment requires or prohibits a conscientious objector exemption
from military service." Similarly, the Court has not addressed
whether providing an exemption for individuals whose opposition to
war rests on religious grounds, but not for those who do not profess a
belief in religion, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. While the Court has faced these issues in numerous
cases, the Justices have chosen to expand the scope of conscientious
objector statutes rather than address the pressing First and Fifth
Amendment problems." By avoiding these constitutional issues, the
Court evades its duty to interpret the law, and leaves open important
questions for lower courts and draft boards to decide.
This Note will argue that the Court should have addressed the
First Amendment and Due Process issues presented in United States
v. Seeger. Part I will discuss the history of conscientious objectors,
which provides a background for Seeger. Part II will examine United
States v. Seeger, and the unpublished opinions which address the
constitutional issues. Part III will argue that the conventional
rationale for invoking the doctrine of avoiding constitutional
questions did not justify the Court's approach to Seeger. This Note
will argue that the omitted concurring and dissenting opinions should
have been included in the final opinion. Part IV will attempt to
explain why the Justices ultimately decided to withdraw their
opinions.

I. A Brief History of Conscientious Objectors
The origins of conscientious objection in America can be traced
back to the ratification of the Constitution.16 The ratification debates
indicated that the Framers considered "rights of conscience" a part of
religious freedom." Throughout the debates, the delegates expressed
14. Lurie, supra note 7, at 138, 144. See also In re Weitzman, 426 F.2d 349, 443-44,
453 (8th Cir. 1970) in which then Judge Blackmun criticized the Court's continuously
evasive position on conscientious objectors.
15. Id. In Welsh v. United States, Justice Harlan argued that the Court has robbed the
Selective Service legislation of all meaning in order to avoid facing the constitutional
question. 398 U.S. at 354 (Harlan, J., concurring).
16. JOHN WITIrE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
EXPERIMENT: ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 80-81 (2d ed. 2006).
17. Id.
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a desire to protect religious peoples' beliefs, and did so by including
"rights of conscience" in the amendments." An early draft of the
First Amendment stated, "Congress shall pass no law establishing a
religion or to prevent the free exercise of, or to infringe upon the
rights of consciousness."" In the Senate, the provision protecting
rights of conscience was deleted, and the final version became what is
now known as the religion clauses of the First Amendment.20
Conscientious objectors have been exempted from military
service since the Revolutionary War.21 The Selective Service Act of
1917 authorized the first national draft during World War I.22
Congress provided a limited exemption for conscientious objectors.23
The first time the Supreme Court reviewed a claim for conscientious
objection was in the Selective Draft Law Cases.24 Petitioners Joseph
Arver and Otto Wangerin challenged their convictions for failing to
register for the Selective Service.25 The Court affirmed Congress'
power to enact a draft, but dismissed the Petitioners' First
Amendment challenge to the clause pertaining to conscientious
objectors.26
The next time the Court addressed the issue of conscientious
objection was in the Naturalization Cases of the 1930s.27 These cases
18.

BERNARD SCHWARTz, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY

1107-09 (1971). Additionally, the bill of rights for many states included conscientious
objector exemptions. Id. at 262, 277, 319.
19. Id. at 87 (quoting DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3:159, 3:166 (Linda DePauw et al. eds., 1972)).

20. Schwartz, supra note 18, at 71-72.
21. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 170-71.
22. Selective Service Act of 1917, ch. 15, § 2, 40 Stat. 76, 77 (1917).
23. Selective Service Act of 1917, ch. 15, § 4, 40 Stat. 76, 78 (1917), repealedby Pub. L.
No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 643 (1966). The statute provided an exemption for ordained ministers,
students in divinity schools, and members of the Quakers, Mennonites, Amish, and other
well-recognized religious sects whose tenets forbade its members from participating in war
in any form. Id. See also Harlan F. Stone, The Conscientious Objector, 21 COLUMBIA
UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY 253, 256 (1919).
24. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
25. Leon Friedman, Conscription and the Constitution: The Original Understanding,
67 MICH. L. REV. 1493,1495 (1969).
26. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. at 389-90. In the conclusion of the case, the
Court said, "[aJnd we pass without anything but statement the proposition that an
establishment of a religion or an interference with the free exercise thereof repugnant to
the First Amendment resulted from the exemption clauses of this act to which we at the
outset referred, because we think its unsoundness is too apparent to require us to do
more." Id.
27. Ronald B. Flowers, Government Accommodation of Religious-Based
Conscientious Objection, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 695, 698 (1993).
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established significant precedent that the Court relied on in Seeger.
The Naturalization Act of 1906 required an applicant for citizenship
to take an oath to "[s]upport and defend the Constitution of the
United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and bear true
faith and allegiance to the same."2 9 In United States v. Schwimmer,
the Court addressed whether a pacifist could be denied citizenship
because she could not take this oath in good conscience.' The Court
denied Schwimmer's citizenship application and held that all citizens
have a duty to defend the government against all enemies whenever
the necessity arose." Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes dissented, and
stated that Schwimmer's pacifism should not have precluded her from
citizenship."

In United States v. Macintosh, the Court denied

citizenship on similar grounds.33 Justices Holmes, Louis Brandeis, and
Harlan Stone joined Chief Justice Evan Hughes in a passionate
dissent.' Although he did not define religion, Chief Justice Hughes
stated, "[the essence of religion is belief in a relation to God
involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation."35
Chief Justice Hughes believed that in the "forum of conscience, the
duty to a moral power higher than the state has always been
maintained."36
The Supreme Court reversed Schwimmer and Macintosh in
Girouard v. United States." Girouard was a Canadian citizen whose

religious beliefs prevented him from reciting the oath of citizenship.
In the majority opinion by Justice William Douglas, the Court held
that Girouard did not need to violate his religious creed and swear to
bear arms in order to obtain citizenship.39 The Court interpreted
28. See discussion infra Part II.A.
29. Naturalization Act of 1906, ch. 3592, § 4, 34 Stat. 596, 598 (1906) (current version
at 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2006)).
30. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 646 (1929).
31. Id. at 650.
32. Id. at 655 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justices Brandeis and Sanford joined in the
dissent. Id. at 653, 655.
33. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 626 (1931).
34. Id. at 627, 635 (Hughes, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 633-34.
36. Id. at 634.
37. Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
38. Id. at 61-62.
39. Id. at 64. Throughout the opinion, Justice Douglas repeatedly referred to Justice
Holmes' dissent in Schwimmer, and Chief Justice Hughes's dissent in Macintosh. Id. at
64-66,68.
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congressional intent in the Selective Service Act of 1940 to mean " . . .
that even in times of war, one may truly support and defend our
institutions though he stops short of using weapons of war.""
Congress amended the Selective Service Act in 1948.41 The Act
required every male citizen between the ages of eighteen and twentySection 456(j)
six to register with the Selective Service System.'
provided an exemption for conscientious objectors who "by reason of
religious training and belief [were] conscientiously opposed to
participation in war in any form." 43 Religious training and belief was
defined as an ".. . individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being

involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation,
but does not include essentially political, sociological or philosophical
views or a merely personal or moral code."" Local draft boards were
set up to adjudicate conscientious objector exemption claims.45 If an
individual was denied conscientious objector status, he could bring his
claim before an appeal board, which would refer the claim to the
Department of Justice. 46 The Department of Justice would hold a
hearing on the character of the applicant, investigate the applicant's
personal background, and make a recommendation to the appeal
board on whether to grant an exemption. 47 The appeal board would
then make the final decision on the merits of the claim." If an
individual refused to submit to induction into the armed services, he
could face criminal prosecution.49 Upon conviction in federal court,
the individual could be imprisoned for up to five years, and/or fined
up to ten thousand dollars."o
40. Id. at 67.
41. Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, §3, 62 Stat. 604 (1948).
42. Id. at 605.
43. Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 604, 612 [hereinafter Section
6(j)]. A 1967 amendment to this statute struck out the phrase "an individual's belief in a
relation to a Supreme being involving duties superior to those arising from any human
relationship. Universal Military Training and Service Act, 81 Stat. 100, 104 (1967)
(current version at 50 App. U.S.C.A. § 456(j) (2006)).
44. Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 6(j) 62 Stat. at 604, 613.
45. Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 10, 62 Stat. at 620 (1948) (current version
at 50 App. U.S.C.A. § 460 (2006)).
46. Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. at 613 (1948) (current
version at 50 App. U.S.C.A. § 456(j) (2006)).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 12462(a), 62 Stat. at 622 (1948) (current
version at 50 App. U.S.C.A. §462(a) (2006)).
50. Id.
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Throughout the early twentieth century, the Court gradually
recognized the grave dilemma facing the conscientious objector.
Initially, the majority of the Court did not view conscientious
objectors favorably. Justice Holmes and Chief Justice Hughes
sympathized with conscientious objectors, and established sound
precedent for the Court's opinion in Girouard. The Court's
progressively understanding view towards conscientious objectors
would become a key factor in Seeger.
II. United States v. Seeger
A. The Opinion

United States v. Seeger combined the cases of three individuals,
Daniel Seeger, Arno Sascha Jakobson, and Forest Britt Peter,
convicted of refusing induction into the armed forces under the
Selective Service Act of 1948." All three were denied conscientious
objector status by their draft boards because the boards believed they
did not satisfy the qualifications of Section 456(j). 5 2 Each professed
different religious beliefs, and all asserted different grounds for
challenging the statute."
Daniel Seeger claimed that he could not answer whether he
believed in a supreme being with a "yes" or "no." 54 Seeger contended
that skepticism in the existence of God did not mean he lacked faith
in anything whatsoever." Rather, he believed in "goodness and virtue
for their own sakes, and a religious faith in a purely ethical creed." 6
Seeger argued that the language of Section 6(j) violated the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment because Congress did not
provide an exemption for non-religious conscientious objectors.
Additionally, Seeger challenged Section 6(j) on Due Process grounds,
because the law discriminated between different forms of religious
The district court was unsympathetic to Seeger's
expression."
51. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 167-69. The 1951 Amendment to the Selective Service act
changed the popular name of the statute to the "Universal Military Training and Service
Act." Universal Military Training and Service Act, ch. 144, § 1(a), 65 Stat. 75, 75 (1951).
52. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 167-69.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 166.
55. Id.
56. Id. Seeger also credited Plato, Aristotle, and Spinoza for support of his beliefs.
Id.
57. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165.
58. Id.
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constitutional claims, and found Seeger guilty of failure to submit to
induction. 9 The Second Circuit reversed Seeger's conviction, and the
government appealed.6
Arno Sascha Jakobson believed in a "Supreme Being" who was a
"Creator of Man," and "ultimately responsible for the existence of
man."61 Jakobson believed in a relationship to "Godness," and that it
would strain his conscience if he were forced to participate in military
service. 62 The Department of Justice concluded that his claim was
based on a personal moral code and was insincere.6 ' Accordingly, the
draft board refused to classify Jakobson as a conscientious objector,
but did not indicate the grounds for its decision." The Second Circuit
reversed Jackobson's conviction, and the government appealed. 5
Forest Britt Peter believed that taking a human life was against
his personal moral code, and he considered this belief superior to his
obligation to the state.' He described his religious beliefs as a
consciousness about man's harmony with nature.6 ' He admitted that
one could call his convictions a belief "in a Supreme Being," but
those were not the words he chose to use.6 In sum, Seeger, Jakobson,
and Peter's collective grounds for conscientious objector exemption
included a belief in "goodness and virtue for their own sakes," a
relationship to "Godness," and a belief in a higher moral code
superior to that of the state.
The question presented in United States v. Seeger was whether
Section 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act was
constitutional under the Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise

59. United States v. Seeger, 216 F.Supp. 516, 522 (1963).
60. United States v. Seeger, 826 F.2d 846, 855 (2d Cir. 1964). The Second Circuit
addressed the constitutionality of Section 6(j), and whether the Supreme Being
requirement could be validly employed to reject Seeger's claim for a conscientious
objector exemption. Id. at 851. The court held that the "Supreme Being" requirement
created an impermissible classification under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Id. at 854.
61. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 167.
62. Id. at 168.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. United States v. Jakobson, 325 F.2d 409, 417 (2d Cir. 1963). In Jakobson, the
Second Circuit invoked the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, and read the definition of
"religious training and belief" in Section 6(j) as broadly as possible. Id. at 415.
66. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 169.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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Clause, and the Due Process Clause.69 Oral arguments were heard in
November of 1964,70 and the decision was announced on March 8,
1965.

Justice Tom Clark wrote for the majority.72 Justice Clark phrased
the question presented as whether the term "Supreme being" in
Section 6(j) meant an orthodox belief in God, or the broader concept
of a power "to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is
ultimately dependent." 73 Justice Clark began by tracing the history of
the Universal Military Training and Service Act, and noted that
Section 6(j) contained the same language as the conscientious
objector exemption in the 1940 Selective Service Act.74 The definition
of "religious training and belief" in the 1940 statute was nearly
identical to Chief Justice Hughes' language in United States v.
Macintosh." The only difference between Chief Justice Hughes'
definition of religion and the 1940 statute was that Congress
substituted the phrase "Supreme being" for the word "God."76
Justice Clark concluded that this substitution indicated Congress'
intent to expand the definition of religion articulated in Macintosh.
With this broad definition of religion in mind, Justice Clark
formulated a test to determine whether an individual qualified as a
conscientious objector under Section 6(j). In order to qualify for the
conscientious objector exemption, an individual must have a "sincere
and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a
place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualif[ied]
for the exemption comes within the statutory definition."7 The Court
believed that this test would embrace the expanding concept of
modern religion. Justice Clark announced that the Court "construed
69. Id. at 165.
70. PETER IRONS, THE COURAGE OF THEIR CONVICTIONS, 162 (1988).

71. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 163.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 174.
74. Id. at 175.
75. Id. at 176. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1931) (Hughes, C.,
dissenting). ("The essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties
superior to those arising from any human relation.") See discussionsupra Part I.
76. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 175.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 176.
79. Id. at 180. The Court refers to the writings of Dr. Paul Tillich, John A. T.
Robinson, and Dr. David Saville Muzzey in support of the modem religious community's
understanding of religion. Id. at 180-83.
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the statutory definition broadly and it follows that any exception to it
must be interpreted narrowly."" However, the conscientious objector
exemption would be reserved for those whose opposition to war was
based on grounds that can fairly be interpreted as "religious,"' and
not solely based on a "personal moral code."8 2 Justice Clark believed
this test avoided the constitutional questions presented by the
Respondents, and therefore declined to address them."'
Additionally, the Court believed this test would be easy for lower
courts to apply.' The trier of fact would need to determine whether
"the claimed belief occup[ies] the same place in the life of the
objector as an orthodox belief in God holds in the life of one clearly
qualified for exemption."" However, the validity of the objector's
belief could not be questioned.8 6 Rather, local draft boards and lower
courts would have to decide "whether the beliefs professed by a
registrant are sincerely held and whether they are, in their own
scheme of things, religious."87
Applying the new test, the Court reversed the convictions of all
three Respondents.'
Justice Clark noted that the Respondents'
objections were based on religious beliefs, and not on a personal
moral code.89 The Court held that Seeger professed a "religious
belief," did not disavow a relation to a Supreme being, and that his
beliefs were sincerely held." The Court concluded Jakobson had
demonstrated that his opposition to war was related to a Supreme
being.91 Similarly, the Court reversed Peter's conviction, because his
belief in "some power manifest in nature" which was the "supreme

80. Id. at 186.
81. Id. at 180.
82. Id. at 186.
83. Id. "This construction avoids imputing to Congress an intent to classify different
religious beliefs, exempting some and excluding others, and is in accord with the wellestablished congressional policy of equal treatment for those whose opposition to service
is grounded in their religious tenets." Id. at 176.
84. Id. at 183.
85. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 184.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 185.
88. Id. at 187.
89. Id. at 186.
90. Id.
91. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 186.
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expression" helping "man in ordering his life," satisfied the Seeger
test for conscientious objectors.9
In a concurring opinion, Justice Douglas acknowledged, "[i]f I
read the statute differently from the Court, I would have difficulties"
because "those who embraced one religious faith rather than another
Additionally, the statute would
would be subject to penalties....
run afoul of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by
preferring some religions over others.94 Although the legislative
history of Section 6(j) "leaves much in the dark," Justice Douglas
argued that the decision was not any more "tour de force" than
"other instances where we have gone to extremes to construe an Act
of Congress to save it from demise on constitutional grounds."95
Justice Douglas noted that many religions that have taken a
stronghold in the United States do not subscribe to a Judeo-Christian
idea of God. 96 Justice Douglas agreed with the Court's interpretation
of supreme being because he believed Congress was cognizant of
these kinds of religious beliefs when enacting the statute. 97
B. Unpublished Opinions

Although a unanimous decision was ultimately reached, the
Justices' papers reveal that in the days leading up to the
announcement, there was significant disagreement about the way the
Court should decide Seeger.98 Justice Clark's opinion avoids the fact
that the Respondents challenged the constitutionality of Section 6(j).'
Although Justices Clark and Douglas praise the opinion for avoiding

92. Id. at 187-88.
93. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 188 (Douglas, J., concurring). Id. Originally, Justice Douglas
wrote his opinion in response to Justice Goldberg's concurrence. BERNARD SCHWARTZ,

572
(1983); see also discussion infra Part II.B.
94. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 188 (Douglas, J., concurring).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 189-91. Justice Douglas refers to Buddhists, Confucianists, and Taoists. Id.
97. Id. at 192.
98. Although some scholars have addressed these unpublished opinions, there has
been no thorough discussion of all three unpublished opinions. A brief discussion of
Justice Black's opinion can be found in TINSEY E. YARBROUGH, MR. JUSTICE BLACK
AND HIS CRITICS, 156 (1988). Bernard Schwartz refers to Justice Goldberg's unpublished
opinion in Super Chief. Schwartz, supra note 93, at 571-72.
99. Namely, whether Section 6(j) runs afoul of the religious clauses of the First
Amendment because it limits the conscientious objector exemption to those opposed to
war in general because of theistic beliefs. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 345 (Harlan J., concurring).
SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT-A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY
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constitutional issues,'" the Court should have addressed the
constitutional questions presented.
A draft of an unpublished concurring opinion by Justice Arthur
Goldberg addressed whether Congress had "the constitutional right
to limit the exemption by... discriminate [ing] between those
religious persons who hold theistic beliefs and those who do not."o.
Justice Goldberg criticized the Court for reading out Congress' clear
intention to restrict exemption to individuals holding a belief "in
relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising
from any human relation."" 02 Justice Goldberg noted that Seeger
clearly presented the issue of "whether under the First Amendment
Congress had the constitutional right to limit the exemption among
religious persons to those who hold theistic beliefs." 03 The Court
"granted certiorari to determine this issue, a grave and important one
involving the religious clause of the First Amendment."10" The
majority opinion reads out "the clear limitation on the conscientious
objector exemption which Congress wrote."o
Justice Goldberg
disagreed with the majority's approach, and believed he was
"compelled to face up to the constitutional issue clearly presented by
Seeger's -case and would hold the limitation in the statute
unconstitutional under the First Amendment as preferring theistic
over nontheistic religions."'

Justice
Goldberg
acknowledged
that
constitutionally
questionable statutes are to be read so as to avoid constitutional
objections, but "this does not mean that the Court is free to rewrite
the statute for Congress."' 7 In addressing the First Amendment
challenges, Justice Goldberg believed that Section 6(j)
unconstitutionally discriminates among religions, particularly in light

100. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 186, 188 (Douglas, J., concurring).
101. Arthur Goldberg, draft of concurring opinion to United States v. Seeger, 4, Feb. 8,
1965, Box A171, Folder 1, The Tarlton Law Library, University of Texas at Austin, Papers
of Justice Tom C. Clark.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 2.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Goldberg, supra note 101, at 9. Goldberg cites Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378
U.S. 500, 515 (1964), and Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379 (1933), for this
proposition. Id. at 9-10.
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of the Court's recent decisions in Torcaso v. Watkins0 and Everson v.

Justice Goldberg further noted that
Board of Education."
Buddhism, Confucionism, and Taoism are nontheistic religions whose
many subscribers living in the United States would not be granted
exemption under 6(j)."o
Additionally, Justice Goldberg pointed out the practical issues
with administering the Seeger test. Under this new test,"' draft
boards, the Department of Justice, and district courts were vested
with determining what constitutes a belief in a "Supreme Being."" 2
The adjudicators also must decide whether an individual has a belief
which can be deemed "religious," and whether that belief is
"sincerely held.""' Justice Goldberg would "have done [away] with
this business of judicially examining other people's beliefs." 1 4
While he would have declared Section 6(j) unconstitutional,
Justice Goldberg argued that the provision was severable from the
rest of the Selective Service Act."' The Selective Service Act
included a severability clause, and accordingly, Goldberg concluded
that Section 6(j) should be severed from the rest of the Universal
Military Training and Service Act."6 Goldberg suggested that
Congress should do away with religious qualifications for the

108. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). In Torcaso, the Court held, "neither a
State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person 'to profess a belief
or disbelief in any religion.' Neither can constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements
which aid all religions as against non-believers, and neither can aid those religions based
on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs."
Id. at 495.
109. Goldberg, supra note 101, at 11. See also, Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18
(1947). In Everson, the Court found that the First Amendment "requires the state to be
neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers."
110. Goldberg, supra note 101, at 11.
111. See discussion supra at Part II.A.
112. Goldberg, supra note 101, at 12-13.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 13 (quoting United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 95 (1944)).
115. Id. at 14.
116. Id. at 14-15. Goldberg quotes the 1951 amendment to the Universal Military
Training and Service Act, which stated, "[i]f any provisions of this Act or the application
thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid the validity of the remainder of the
Act and of the circumstances of such provision to other persons and circumstances shall
not be affected thereby." Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, ch. 144, §
5, 65 Stat. 75, 88 (1951).
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conscientious objector exemption, and warns that neither "Church
nor State may become unduly involved in the affairs of the other."..
The unpublished draft of Justice Hugo Black's concurring
opinion largely echoed Justice Goldberg's reasoning."' Justice Black
agreed that the Court should address the First Amendment
challenges to Section 6(j)."9 In addition to the reasons articulated by
Justice Goldberg, Justice Black argued that the statute violates the
First Amendment "by choosing between conscientious beliefs which
are religious and those which are not."' 20 Justice Black sympathized
with the plight of conscientious objectors who, under Section 6(j),
must "either offend their conscience by professing a belief they do
not have, violate their conscience by going into combat service, or go
to jail as draft-dodgers."21 Justice Black criticized the statute for
making a "broad frontal attack on the individual's right not to be
discriminated against by [the] Government because of his beliefs."122
Although Justice Black recognized Congress' authority to conscript
citizens, he argued that this did not grant Congress the power to "run
roughshod over the First Amendment." 123 Justice Black criticized the
majority from departing from the Court's recent First Amendment
Justice Black concluded that the Respondents'
decisions. 12
convictions should be reversed because Section 6(j) violates the First

Amendment.125
Similarly, a draft of Justice Harlan's unpublished dissent asserts
that "the constitutional issues presented by these cases cannot be
avoided." 126 Justice Harlan argued that the First Amendment does
not require a conscientious objector provision in conscription
statutes, and that Congress would be entitled to exempt all
117. Id. at 16-17. Goldberg points out that in World War I and World War II,
Congress exempted all persons who were conscientiously opposed to participating in war
without regard to religious qualification. Id.
118. Hugo Black, draft of concurring opinion to United States v. Seeger, 1, Feb. 24,
1965, Box 526, Folder 2, Library of Congress, Papers of Earl Warren.
119. Id. at 2-3.
120. Id. at 1.
121. Id. at 2.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 2-3.
124. Id. at 3. Justice Black refers to Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), and West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Id.
125. Id.
126. John Marshall Harlan, draft of dissenting opinion to United States v. Seeger, 1,
Feb. 16, 1965, Box 1:20, 64-50, Folders 5-6, Library of Congress, Papers of William J.
Brennan, Jr.
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conscientious objectors regardless of their religious beliefs. 27 Justice
Harlan believed the question presented was "whether the
Constitution allows Congress to choose an intermediate position, and
if so, whether the intermediate position it has taken in the existing
statute is constitutionally permissible."'28 Justice Harlan echoed
Justices Goldberg and Black's opinions, and agreed that the Supreme
Being clause indicated Congress' intent to draw the line between
theistic and nontheistic beliefs.12 9 Unlike Justice Goldberg however,
Justice Harlan found this classification to be permissible.'3
Justice Harlan acknowledged that the Court's recent First
Amendment cases compelled application of a heightened level of
scrutiny in this case.' Justice Harlan weighed the infringement upon
the Respondents' First Amendment rights against Congress'
justification for doing so, and concluded that Congressional power to
raise an army, and the magnitude of the conscription problem
outweighed the Respondents' establishment clause claims.'3 2 In his
conclusion, Justice Harlan claimed that Seeger's interest "when
weighed against the tremendous congressional national interest in
accommodating religious free exercise and national defense ... are
not in my opinion sufficient to render the conscientious provision
unconstitutional." 33
IH. An Argument Against Avoidance
Although the Court did not articulate the reason for doing so,
the Justices used the avoidance canon of statutory construction in
United States v. Seeger."

Instead of addressing the Respondents'

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 3.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 4. Justice Harlan cites McLaughlin v. Florida,379 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)
(Harlan, J., concurring), for this standard of scrutiny. Id.
132. Id. at 5.
133. Id. at 7.
134. Justice Goldberg points this out in his unpublished concurring opinion. Goldberg,
supra note 101, at 9. A number of scholars have noticed this as well. See Philip P. Frickey,
Gettingfrom Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal Process Theory, and
Narrowing Statutory Interpretationin the Early Warren Court, 93 CAL. L. REv. 397, 43839, n. 246 (2005); John Sexton, The Warren Court and the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment, in THE WARREN COURT: A RETROSPECrIVE 104, 112 (Bernard Schwartz,

ed., 1996); Lindenbaum, supra note 8, at 238.
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First Amendment concerns, the Court chose to broadly interpret the
meaning of "Supreme Being" to include the Respondents' views."'
The avoidance canon is a rule of statutory construction for
federal courts.'" When a statute "is susceptible of two constructions,
by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and
by the other of which such questions are avoided, [a court's] duty is to
adopt the latter."137 The roots of the avoidance canon can be traced
to the initial justification for judicial review in Marbury v. Madison.'
When interpreting a statute, the Court presumes that the legislature
acts within its constitutional authority.3 The Court has no power to
consider otherwise, unless a case or controversy forces it to.1
Justice Brandeis articulated the modern approach to the
avoidance canon in Ashwander v. TVA.14 ' Brandeis described the
avoidance doctrine as consisting of a series of seven rules. 142 The rule
that crystallizes the avoidance canon states, "[t]he Court will not pass
upon a constitutional question, although properly presented by the
record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case
may be disposed."143 Brandeis believed it was fundamental to
maintaining separation of powers that the judiciary not exercise
judicial review unless all alternative grounds for the decision have
been exhausted."
The avoidance canon has been praised as a way to preserve
judicial independence and promote deference to other constitutional
decision-makers. 145 However, the avoidance canon can frustrate
135. See discussion supra Part II.A.
136. Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003,
1004 (1994).
137. United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408
(1909).
138. William K. Kelley, Avoiding ConstitutionalQuestions as a Three-Branch Problem,
86 CORNELL L. REV. 831, 836 (2001). Chief Justice Marshall believed that as a nonlawmaking body, the Court should construe the legislature's work to avoid constitutional
doubt, unless those questions become "indispensably necessary" to the case. Id. at 837
(quoting Ex parte Randolph, 20 F. Cas. 242,254 (C.C.D. Va. 1833) (No. 11, 558)).
139. Id. at 837.
140. Id.
141. Kloppenberg, supra note 136, at 1015.
142. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
143. Id. at 347.
144. Id. at 34-48 (outlining several rules the Court developed for avoiding
constitutional questions).
145. See e.g. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962);
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME (1999); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a
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constitutional scholars seeking clarification on constitutional
questions, and has been subjected to some criticism by scholars and
judges.'6 The main critique is that "the avoidance cannon allows a
court, on the vague ground that a serious constitutional question
exists, to rewrite statutes without clear limits on the revising role, and
without a clear demonstration that the Constitution compels rejecting
the most natural interpretation of the law."147 Instead of voiding the
statute and returning to the status quo, the avoidance canon
''produces a judicially rewritten statute without democratic
legitimacy" guaranteed by the legislative process.'" Although the
Court claims to be exercising judicial restraint, in actuality, the
avoidance canon results in an extreme flexing of judicial power. 4 9
During the early years of the Warren Court, Chief Justice Earl
Warren urged his fellow Justices to issue opinions on nonconstitutional grounds.o The avoidance canon was one way Chief
Justice Warren could convince more moderate Justices to join a
majority opinion."' However, after Justices White and Goldberg
joined the Court, a liberal coalition was formed, and the avoidance

canon was utilized less.15 2
While the avoidance canon is a valuable judicial tool in many
respects, this Note argues that the Court should not have avoided the
constitutional questions presented in Seeger. Seeger did not present a
situation where the traditional reasons for using the avoidance canon
existed. While the result in Seeger was favorable to the specific
individuals involved in the case, the Court should have reached this
decision on constitutional grounds, and Justices Goldberg, Black, and
Harlan should not have withdrawn their respective opinions.
Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1204-06 (1992); Richard A. Posner, Forward:A
PoliticalCourt,119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 39-43 (2005).
146. See e.g. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation,137 U.
PA. L. REV. 1007, 1020-22, 1066 (1989), Kelley supra note 136; Lisa A. Kloppenberg,
Avoiding Serious Constitutional Doubts: The Supreme Court's Construction of Statues
Raising Free Speech Concerns, 30 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 1 (1996); Kloppenberg, supra note
136, John Copeland Nagle, Delaware Hudson Revisited, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495
(1997).
147. Frickey, supra note 134, at 400.
148. Id. at 400-01.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 401.
151. Id. at 437.
152. Id. After the 1961 term, Justices Whittaker and Frankfurter were replaced by
Justices White and Goldberg. Id. Justice Goldberg proved to be a reliable liberal vote,
which gave the Court a solid liberal majority. Id.
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A. Countermajoritarian Justification

The countermajoritarian justification for the avoidance canon
does not support the Court's decision to avoid the constitutional
questions in Seeger."' In fact, by avoiding the constitutional issues,
the Court acted in a countermajoritarian way by dramatically
misinterpreting Congressional intent. A fundamental justification for
the avoidance canon is that judicial review of legislative acts is a
"delicate function," particularly in light of "'possible consequences
for others stemming also from constitutional roots."" Advocates of
the avoidance canon claim that when the Court declares a legislative
act unconstitutional, it acts in a countermajoritarian way by thwarting
the will of the people's representatives. 5
However, Justice Clark's interpretation of Section 6(j) can hardly
be read as a faithful interpretation of Congressional intent. Justice
Clark believed that substituting the word "Supreme Being" for
"God" indicated Congress' intent to broaden the types of beliefs
eligible for conscientious objection."' While the Court's analysis of
Congressional intent was a noble effort to include the belief systems
held by the Respondents, it represents an overly generous conception
of what Congress had in mind when writing the statute.
As Justice Harlan pointed out in a subsequent conscientious
objector decision, throughout American history, legislators commonly
used various synonyms for the concept of a deity.157 Replacing "God"
with "Supreme Being" may indicate that Congress took into account
a broader concept of religion when writing the statute. However, in
Seeger, the Court interprets this substitution of words to indicate an

153. For the purposes of the discussion, countermajoritarian means "the tension
between the powers exercised by an unelected judiciary and the political primacy of
legislative and executive bodies substantially more responsive to the short-term popular
will." Frederick Shauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SuP. Cr. REV. 71, 71 (1995).
154. Kloppenberg, supra note 136, at 1036 (quoting Rescue Army v. Municipal Court
of L.A., 331 U.S. 549, 571 (1947). See also Ashwander, supra note 142, at 345 (Brandeis, J.,
concurring), referencing other cases to support the claim for the "gravity and delicacy" of
this function.
155. Bickel, supra note 145, at 16-17.
156. See discussionsupra Part II.A.
157. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 349-50, n. 3 (Harlan, J., concurring). The Declaration of
Independence refers to "Nature's God," "Creator," "Supreme Judge of the world."
References to Deity in preambles to state constitutions include interchangeably, "God,"
"Almighty God" and "Supreme Being." Id. (quoting A. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, CHURCH
AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 561 (1964)).
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expansive belief system, not all of which could be based on religious
creeds with a "belief in a Supreme Being." 58
Additionally, the legislative history of Section 6(j) clearly
indicates Congressional intent to draw a distinction between theistic
and nontheistic religions.' The 1940 Selective Service Act did not
include the phrase "Supreme Being" in the definition of a
conscientious objector.'6 Prior to the amended Selective Service Act
in 1948, the Second and Ninth Circuit disagreed on the proper
interpretation of the 1940 Act.16' The Ninth Circuit implied that
religion was to be conceived of in theistic terms, 62 but the Second
Circuit held that religion should be thought of as one's conscience. 6 3
When Congress amended the statute in 1948, it explicitly adopted the
Ninth Circuit's interpretation.'" Congress' decision to use the more
theistic definition of religion as proffered by the Ninth Circuit, as
opposed to a broader concept of "conscience," indicates that Justice
Clark's expansive reading of congressional intent was misguided.
Congress could have chosen to adopt a broader theory of religion and
adopted the Second Circuit's interpretation, but they explicitly
decided not to do so. Therefore, the Court's interpretation of Section
6(j) in Seeger is contrary to the legislative history of the statute.
The Respondents' beliefs in Seeger could be characterized more
accurately as an expression of conscience, and were more akin to the
Second Circuit's definition of religion.'6 1 Seeger's grounds for
conscientious objection rested on a belief in "the welfare of humanity

158. See discussion supra Part II.A.
159. See discussion supra Part II.B.
160. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720 § 5(g), 54 Stat. 888 (repealed
by the Selective Service Act of 1948, 62 Stat. at 613, ch. 625 § 6(j), (1948)).
161. Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377, 380-81 (9th Cir. 1946), and United States
v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1943).
162. Berman, 156 F.2d at 380-81. The Ninth Circuit's description of religion discusses
"[f]aith in a supreme power above and beyond the law of all creation," and held that "no
matter how pure and admirable [Berman's] standard may be and no matter how devotedly
he adheres to it, his philosophy and morals and social policy without the concept of a deity
cannot be said to be religion in the sense of the term as it is used in the statute." Id.
163. Kauten, 133 F.2d at 708. The Second Circuit held that a "compelling voice of
conscience" should be regarded as a religious impulse, and that a conscientious objector's
grounds for exception "may justly be regarded as a response of the individual to a inward
mentor, call it conscience or God, that is for many persons at the present time the
equivalent of what has always been thought a religious impulse." Id.
164. S. REP. No. 80-1268, at 14 (1948).
165. See Kauten supra note 161.
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and the preservation of democratic values."'" Jakobson professed a
complicated belief in relation to "Godness" in a "vertical and
horizontal sense."'6 Peter's belief that war violated "moral law" was
based on the writings of poets like Blake, Emerson, and Whitman."
The "Supreme Being" requirement of Section 6(j) did not include
belief systems based on "goodness and virtue for their own sakes," or
a vague belief in "Godness."
In attempting to avoid striking down a statute enacted by
Congress, the Court acted in a countermajoritarian way by imposing a
definition upon the statute that Congress implicitly rejected. The will
of the people, expressed through Congress, intended to limit the
conscientious objector description to individuals who possessed
theistic beliefs in a "Supreme Being." 69 In order to avoid addressing
First Amendment questions, the Court supplemented its definition of
a "Supreme Being" to include individuals whose religious beliefs
The
were based on the broad idea of conscience.'
countermajoritarian rationale for invoking the avoidance canon fails
to justify the Court's use of the canon in Seeger.
Occasionally, the Constitution compels the Court to act in a
countermajoritarian way and strike down legislation that violates the
Constitution."' However, neither the avoidance canon nor the
Constitution should allow the Court to act in a countermajoritarian
manner out of convenience.172 Justice Clark's opinion in Seeger
conveniently rewrites clear Congressional intent in order to avoid
addressing the First Amendment question before the Court. Had
Justices Goldberg, Black, and Harlan's opinions been included in
Seeger, Justice Clark's countermajoritarian approach to Section 6(j)
would be made apparent, and the Court's true frustrations with
Section 6(j) would be made clear to lower courts.

166. Seeger, 326 F.2d at 848.
167. Jakobson, 325 F.2d at 412.
168. Peter v. United States, 324 F.2d 173, 174 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1963). "Since human life is
for me a final value, I consider it a violation of moral law to take human life. I think I
have reached this conviction out of my reading of such writings as those of Blake
(Christian mystic), Emerson, Whitman, and more modern poets who have touched on the
question." Id.
169. See discussion supra Part III.A.
170. See discussion supra Part II.A.
171. Gerald Gunther, Subtle Vices of the Passive Virtues-A Comment on Principleand
Expediency in JudicialReview, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 6 (1964).
172. Id. at 25.
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B. Separation of Power Justification

A related justification for the avoidance canon. is that it
encourages the proper separation of powers among the three
branches of government."3
By not addressing constitutional
questions, the Court preserves a "healthy, cooperative attitude
between the Court and Congress by 'remanding' issues for careful
congressional deliberation." 4 Invoking the avoidance canon notifies
Congress of the constitutional issues in a statute which the legislature
is properly suited to address."'7 Furthermore, avoiding constitutional
questions provides the Court with some precedent if the Court faces a
similar case in the future."' The avoidance canon is useful in the
sense that the Court can consider how a decision may infringe on the
constitutional authority of another branch."' If the Court clearly
indicates it will not reach the constitutionality of a particular piece of
legislation, the other branches (specifically Congress) are free to
fulfill their constitutional duties."' This view supports a fairly strict
adherence to the canon in order to avoid undue intervention into
executive or legislative authority."9
The separation of powers justification, however, does not
support the Court's use of the avoidance canon in Seeger. This
justification assumes that the Court explicitly discussed the reasoning
for using the canon." Seeger did not explain why the Court avoided
the constitutional questions. Instead, Justice Clark chose to discuss
Congressional intent in enacting 6(j), and then construed the statute
in an excessively broad manner so as to include the Respondents'
beliefs in the statute."' Although the Court may have had future
Congressional actions in mind when deciding Seeger, by not providing
an explanation for using the avoidance canon, they left Congress

173. Kloppenberg, supra note 136, at 1048.
174. Frickey, supra note 134, at 446.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Kloppenberg, supra note 136, at 1050. Kloppenberg refers to Bickel's argument
in The Least Dangerous Branch that, "When the Court clearly indicates that it will not
reach the constitutionality of the legislative action, the other branches can operate
relatively free from countermajoritarian influence." Id.
179. Id.
180. Frickey, supra note 134, at 446. See also Lisa Kloppenberg, Avoiding Serious
ConstitutionalDoubts, supra note 146, at 2223.
181. See discussion supra Part II.A.
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without any real guidance as to how to avoid First Amendment issues
in future amendments to the statute.
Seeger did not provide Congress with any guidance on how to
address the First Amendment concerns in Section 6().'" When the
Universal Military Service and Training Act was amended in 1967,
Congress removed the phrase "Supreme Being," but left the
remainder of the statute intact."' Perhaps after reading Seeger,
members of Congress understood the incredible leap the Court took
in expanding the meaning of "Supreme Being" to avoid constitutional
problems. However, this does not indicate that Congress was made
aware of the First Amendment issues in defining who qualifies for
conscientious objection. The 1967 amendment still required the
grounds for conscientious objection to be based on "religious training
and belief."" In their concurring opinions, Justices Goldberg and
Black criticize this religious training and belief requirement on First
Amendment grounds."' Had Justices Goldberg and Black not
withdrawn their opinions, Congress might have recognized the First
Amendment problems with defining conscientious objection in this
manner.
Additionally, the Court was no less "informed" on the First
Amendment issues the next time conscientious objectors came before
the Court. The Court revisited the conscientious objector exemption
in Welsh v. United States.'"

Once again, the Court invoked the

avoidance canon, and interpreted the statute in an expansive manner
to include Welsh's beliefs in the exemption." According to the
Court's interpretation, the two groups of registrants that do not
qualify for the exemption are those whose beliefs are not deeply held,
and "those whose objection to war does not rest at all upon moral,
182. The Eighth Circuit recognized Congress' curious interpretation of Seeger in
United States v. Levy. United States v. Levy, 419 F.2d 360, 365-66 (8th Cir. 1969).
183. Military Selective Service Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-40, § 7(j), 81 Stat 100, 104
(1967).
184. Id. The relevant portion of the conscientious objector provision states: "[n]othing
contained in this title shall be construed to require any person to be subject to combatant
training and service in the armed forces of the United States who, by reason of religious
training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. As used
in this subsection, the term 'religious training and belief' does not include essentially
political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code." Id.
185. Goldberg, supra note 101; Black, supra note 118.
186. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
187. Id. at 343. Interestingly, Justice Black wrote the majority opinion in Welsh. This
seems to contradict Justice Black's position in his unpublished concurring opinion in
Seeger, which addressed the First Amendment problems. See discussionsupra Part II.B.
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ethical or religious principle but instead rests solely upon
considerations of policy, pragmatism, or expediency.""
In a lengthy concurring opinion, Justice Harlan expressed his
dissatisfaction with the Court's interpretation of Section 6(j).181
Justice Harlan began his concurring opinion by stating that he joined
the majority in Seeger "with the gravest misgivings as to whether it
was a legitimate exercise in statutory construction, and today's
decision convinces me that in doing so I made a mistake which I
should now acknowledge."'" He further explained that the "liberties
taken with the statute both in Seeger and today's decision cannot be
justified" by the avoidance canon, and that there "are limits to the
permissible application of that doctrine" which were crossed in Seeger
and Welsh. 9 ' Justice Harlan claimed that "[u]nless we are to assume
an Alice-in-Wonderland world where words have no meaning, I think
it is fair to say that Congress' choice of language cannot fail to convey
to the discerning reader the very policy choice that the prevailing
While Justice Harlan
opinion today completely obliterates. "'9
acknowledged that it is desirable to use the avoidance canon to save a
statute from being deemed unconstitutional, "it is not permissible, in
my judgment to take a lateral step that robs legislation of all meaning
in order to avert the collision between its plainly intended purpose
and the commands of the Constitution."193
Justice Harlan then addressed whether Congress could enact a
conscientious objector exemption which defers to an individual's
conscience only when his views emanate from theistic religious
beliefs. 94 Contrary to his unpublished dissent in Seeger, Justice
Harlan concluded that Congress could not draw a line between
theistic and non theistic religious beliefs for the purpose of
conscientious objector exemption because it would violate the
Establishment Clause.'95 If Congress wished to include an exemption
from military service for conscientious objectors, the common

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Welsh, 398 U.S. at 342-43.
Welsh, 398 U.S. at 344 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 345.
Id. at 354.
Id.
Id. at 356.
Id. at 356.
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denominator must be the intensity of moral conviction with which a
belief is held, not the nature of one's beliefs."
If one of the purposes of avoiding constitutional concerns is to
provide guidance to future Congressional deliberations and Court
opinions, Seeger did not adequately address this concern. Justice
Clark did not address why the avoidance canon should be used in
Seeger, which left Congress with no guidance on the First
Amendment problems with Section 6(j). By excluding "Supreme
Being" from the 1967 amendment to the Universal Military Training
Act, Congress acknowledged the disposition of Seeger, but provided
no further guidance on First Amendment issues inherent in the
While it is possible that
conscientious objector exemption.'"
Congress understood the potential Establishment and Free Exercise
problems inherent in a conscientious objector exemption, the fact that
the "religious training and belief" requirement was included in the
revised statute makes this possibility less likely. Five years after
Seeger, the Court again avoided the constitutional issues in a similar
conscientious objector claim. 98 The separation of power justification
does not adequately address why the avoidance canon was proper in
Seeger.
C. Judicial Restraint Justification

The Seeger Court acted in an activist manner by not addressing
the constitutional questions presented. The primary justification of
the avoidance canon is that it is an exercise in judicial restraint. *
Advocates of the avoidance canon claim that the Court should avoid
constitutional issues to prevent itself making doctrine which may have
dangerous implications for the future development of law."
However, invoking this canon in Seeger created exactly what it was
designed to preclude. The Court's reasoning in Seeger represents a

196. Id. at 358.
197. See Military Selective Service Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-40, § 7(j), 81 Stat 100,
104 (1967).
198. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 343.
199. Frickey, supra note 134, at 446.
200. Lisa Kloppenberg, Avoiding Serious Constitutional Doubts, supra note 146, at 58,
74-75, 93 (discussing the effect of Supreme Court's use of the avoidance canon on lower
courts). See also John Hart Ely to Chief Justice Warren, Memorandum, Jan. 28, 1965, 2,
Box 526, Folder 2, Library of Congress, Papers of Earl Warren. Warren's clerk warned
the Chief Justice that the doctrine of avoidance "should be invoked only when doing so
will keep the Court from getting into areas and making doctrine which may have
dangerous implications for the future development of law." Id.
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complete rewriting of the exemption, and misinterprets Congressional
intent; hardly an "exercise in judicial restraint." The Seeger test
produced an unworkable standard, which the Court could have
reasonably anticipated would be difficult for draft boards to
administer.
When the Court avoids constitutional pronouncements and
distorts the meaning of Congressional statutes, lower courts and
administrative agencies are forced to apply the distorted law.20 For
conscientious objectors, this meant that the magnitude of their First
Amendment concerns were not clearly conveyed to the lower courts,
which can lead to nonuniformity in protection of these rights. 203 As a
result, conscientious objectors suffer a loss of liberty because their
First Amendment rights are not fully protected by the Court's evasive
opinion. Since one of the Court's primary functions is to guard
individual liberties and minority interests,204 the use of the avoidance
canon in Seeger meant that the constitutional liberties of
conscientious objectors were left unprotected.205
In his concurring opinion in Welsh, Justice Harlan noted that the
Court should refrain from deciding constitutional questions when
there is good reason to believe the case before them presents an
Nevertheless, it is
unintended unconstitutional consequence."
impermissible "to take a lateral step that robs legislation of all
meaning in order to avert the collisions between its plainly intended
In an earlier
purpose and the commands of the Constitution."2
opinion outlining the avoidance canon, Justice Benjamin Cardozo
noted that "avoidance of a difficulty will not be pressed to the point
of disingenuous evasion." 28 While judges should use the canon to
201. The "Seeger test" refers to Justice Clark's command that the trier of fact (and
local draft boards) in conscientious objector cases determine whether "the claimed belief
occupy the same place in the life of the objector as an orthodox belief in God holds in the
life of one clearly qualified for exemption." Seeger, 380 U.S. at 184.
202. See discussionsupra Part II.A, and infra Part III.C.
203. Kloppenberg, supra note 136, at 1034. Dean Kloppenberg argues, "It is not
obvious, however, that rights are more secure under a flexible system in which the Court
can determine the necessity of reaching a constitutional issue in a particular case. In fact,
a system in which federal courts reject the last resort rule to render more constitutional
decisions may better secure federal rights." Id.
204. Lisa Kloppenberg, The Avoidance Canon: From the Cold War to the War on
Terror, 32 U. DAYTON L. REV. 349, 356 (2007).
205. Id. See also, Kloppenberg, supra note 136, at 1066.
206. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (Harland, J., concurring).
207. Id.
208. Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379 (1933).
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restrain themselves from addressing issues not before them, the canon
becomes ineffective when the Supreme Court appears to be running
from a reoccurring constitutional problem.
Justice Clark's opinion in Seeger is an example of the Court
avoiding a difficult issue to the point of "disingenuous evasion." The
Court completely misinterprets Congressional intent in order to avoid
reaching First and Fifth Amendment issues.209 Justice Clark's
definition of religion is nowhere near what Congress had in mind
when writing Section 6(j), but the Court overlooks this in order to
dodge addressing constitutional questions presented.
According to the Seeger test, when draft boards review a
conscientious objector's application, they are to determine "whether
a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the
life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in
God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption."210 Seeger asked
draft boards to embark on a nearly impossible task. First, draft
boards must determine the "place" a belief in God occupies in the
mind of an individual who would clearly qualify as a conscientious
objector.211
Then, the board must determine the "place" an
opposition to participation in war occupies in the life of the
applicant.2 21 Finally, the Seeger test asks draft boards to compare the
role these beliefs occupy in the lives of an unambiguous conscientious
objector and the applicant before them.213 What standards are draft
boards to use in making these determinations? How, exactly, does
one compare the role a belief system occupies in the lives of two
individuals? Justice Clark did not provide any guidance on these
issues.
Additionally, the Court almost certainly understood that draft
boards were comprised of a wide range of individuals. Studies on the
makeup of local boards revealed that the majority of them were
white, middle-class conservatives, and many members were military
veterans.214 The Court acknowledged that defining a religious belief is
209. See discussionsupra Part IIA, and Part III.A.
210. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166.
211. Id. at 184. Justice Clark most likely meant conscientious objectors who were
historically exempt from service, like the Quakers, Amish, and Mennonites. See Stone,
supra note 23.
212. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 184.
213. Id. Although the Seeger test does not explicitly require lower courts and draft
boards to compare these beliefs, the Seeger test implies such a requirement.
214. Michael E. Tigar and Robert J. Zweben, Selective Service: Some Certain Problems
and Some Tentative Answers, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 510, 527 n. 116 (1969). Tigar and
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a difficult task for religious scholars.215 Despite this difficulty, the
Seeger test asks draft board members-who were generally not
religious scholars-to engage in the nearly impossible task of defining
and comparing individual's belief systems.
If Justices Goldberg, Black, and Harlan had not withdrawn their
opinions in Seeger, the majority's judicial activism would have been
apparent. The Justices' opinions draw attention to Justice Clark's
overly aggressive interpretation of Section 6(j), and the flaws of the
Seeger test.216 Justices Goldberg and Black's concurring opinions
stress the delicacy of evaluating an individual's religious beliefs.
Including these opinions would have acknowledged the tremendous
First Amendment issues that arise when draft boards consider
conscientious objector applications. Justices Goldberg, Black, and
Harlan's opinions demonstrate that the Court could have approached
this constitutional issue in a restrained manner because the Justices'
opinions did not misconstrue Congressional intent or announce a
faulty test. Including Justices Goldberg, Black, and Harlan's opinions
would have demonstrated that addressing the constitutional questions
was a more restrained method of statutory interpretation, protected
the liberty interest of conscientious objectors, and provided guidance
to the lower courts in future conscientious objector cases.
IV. Potential Reason for Withdrawal:
The Political Realities of Vietnam
The Justices' papers reveal that in the days leading up to the
announcement of Seeger, Justices Goldberg, Harlan, and Black's
opinions were still part of the decision. On Thursday March 4, 1965,
Justice Douglas received a note from Justice Clark, which stated that
if Justice Black were to join or concur in Justice Clark's most recent
draft, Justices Goldberg and Harlan would also concur.217 On March
5, Justice Goldberg circulated a memo to the Court, withdrawing his
Zweben cite a study which found that the average local board member was male, fiftyeight years old, a veteran, white, and middle-class. Id. One survey found that fifty-five
percent of local board members in one state thought conscientious objectors should not be
exempt from military service. Id. at 524, n. 91.
215. The Court discusses the various ways religious scholars define religion. Seeger,
380 U.S. at 180-84.
216. See discussion supra Part II. B.
217. Justice Thomas Clark, Memorandum to Justice William 0. Douglas, Mar. 4, 1965,
Box 1342, Folder 10, Library of Congress, Papers of William 0. Douglas. The memo
stated, "If Hugo [Black] joins or concurs in the newest Author [Goldberg] and John
[Harlan] say they will join me." Id.
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concurring opinion, and siding with Justice Clark.218 Justice Black
must have joined with Justice Clark in his March 4 opinion, which
made the decision unanimous. Justice Black appears to have been
the key vote which resulted in the Seeger opinion. A unanimous
opinion, with Justice Douglas concurring, was announced on March 8,
1965.

Predicting why Supreme Court Justices vote the way they do is
far from an exact science, and this Note does not attempt to provide a
complete explanation of the Justices' voting behavior. However,
American involvement in Vietnam during March of 1965 may provide
some insight to the Justices' thought processes.
On February 27, 1965, the State Department released a White
Paper, which addressed North Vietnam's involvement in South
Vietnam. 20 The report stated that the United States had an
obligation to assist South Vietnam, and discussed the State
Department's position on the increasingly violent conflict.221 Behind
closed doors, the State Department decided to implement the first
offensive attack on North Vietnam.222 Operation Rolling Thunder
was a series of sustained fire bombings on North Vietnam, which
began on March 2, 1965.223 While the public remained in the dark
about Operation Rolling Thunder, on March 6, 1965, the New York
Times reported that 3,500 U.S. Marines had been deployed to South
Vietnam.224 American military advisers were already stationed in
South Vietnam, but this was the first time American combat troops
225
were sent to South Vietnam.
There is no direct evidence that the Supreme Court Justices were
aware of the combat troops in South Vietnam before the
announcement was made public.226 However, the Justices were
218. Justice Arthur Goldberg, Memorandum to the Conference, Mar. 5, 1965, Box
1342, Folder 10, Library of Congress, Papers of William 0. Douglas.
219. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 163.
220. Text of U.S. White Paper on North Vietnam's Growing Role in War in the South,
N.Y TIMES, Feb. 27, 1965, at A30.
221. Id.
222. FREDRICK LOGEVALL, CHOOSING WAR: THE LOST CHANCE OF PEACE AND
THE ESCALATION OF WAR IN VIETNAM 344 (1999).
223. Id.

224. Jack Raymonds, 3,500 U.S. Marines Going to Vietnam to Bolster Base, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6,1965, at Al.
225. Logevall, supra note 222, at 363.
226. That is to say, there were not any articles about the deployment of U.S. troops, or
notes between Justices about the incident in any of their papers.

Fall 20101

CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS AND U.S. V. SEEGER

229

undoubtedly aware of United States' foreign affairs, and one can
reasonably assume they read major newspapers like the New York
Times. Furthermore, the Justices were very well-connected in
Washington, so it is possible that they knew of President Lyndon
Johnson's military plans before they were made public.
One reason why Justices Goldberg, Black, and Harlan may have
agreed with Justice Clark's opinion in Seeger could be the fear of
declaring conscientious objection unconstitutional in light of recent
events. With combat troops going into South Vietnam, and the White
Paper exposing the State Departments' increasingly aggressive
position, the Justices may have anticipated an escalating conflict in
Southeast Asia. An increased American involvement in South
Vietnam could require the Selective Service to draft more citizens,
and possibly handle more applications for conscientious objector
exemption. Justices Goldberg, Black, and Harlan discuss the
constitutionality of Section 6(j), which could potentially result in
Congress doing away with the conscientious objector exemption
altogether.227 Based on the Court's historically accommodating
treatment of conscientious objectors, the risk of eliminating the
exemption might have been an uneasy proposal for the Justices.
Justices Goldberg, Black, and Harlan's opinions regarded the position
of conscientious objectors with great respect, and there is little
indication that the Justices wanted to do away with conscientious
objection entirely.2" The three Justices may have chosen to withdraw
their opinions and side with Justice Clark for fear that conscientious
objectors may no longer have the opportunity to apply for exemption
from military service.
Another reason Justices Goldberg, Black, and Harlan may have
chosen to withdraw their opinions is the potential public backlash
against a seemingly anti-military opinion. Historically, the Supreme
Court expressed great deference to the military, particularly during
wartime. 229 At the time, some critics of the exemption claimed that
conscientious objectors were traitors who negated their patriotic duty
by opting out of military service. 30 While the members of the Court

227. Project, Harvard Law Review Supreme Court Statistics, 79 HARv. L. REV. 105,
116 (1965).
228. See discussion supra Part II.B.
229. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
230. Alexander Burnham, Draft Resistance: An Old Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21,
1965, at A26.
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may not have agreed with this appraisal, Justices Goldberg, Black,
and Harlan's opinions were sympathetic to the plight of the
conscientious objector. If Seeger included these other opinions, which
expressed sympathy towards conscientious objectors during a time of
increased support of the military, the Court might have faced harsh
criticism. Although by 1965 the Warren Court was certainly used to
criticism, perhaps the issue of conscientious objection was not
considered a significant concern which warranted a constitutionally
grounded opinion. While these explanations may not have actually
played a role in the Justices' thought processes, they are possible
reasons why the Court's opinion changed over the course of four
days.
The increasingly aggressive U.S. military position in March of
1965 does not, by itself, support Justice Clark's evasive decision in
Seeger. The political realities of war occasionally force the Court to
issue decisions which are heavily criticized by future generations."'
Despite the potential political backlash, Justices Goldberg, Black, and
Harlan should have included their respective opinions in Seeger
because it would have fulfilled the Court's role in protecting
individual liberties.232 If the Justices feared a potential increase in
conscientious objector applicants, the religious liberties of those
applicants would, in fact, be threatened by the Seeger test. As Justice
Black pointed out in his concurring opinion, "[f]reedom to believe
cannot, I fear, survive such sophisticated tests." 233 The Justices
recognized that the malleable Seeger test would be applied
inconsistently among lower federal courts and draft boards, which
could result in diminished First Amendment protections for
conscientious objectors. 23 Although including these opinions may
have subjected the Court to criticism, the importance of defending
the rights of conscientious objectors should have overridden these
concerns.

231. See generally Gregory Magarian, The First Amendment, The Public-Private
Distinction, and Nongovernmental Suppression of Wartime Political Debate, 73 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 101 (2004); Lee Epstein, Daniel E. Ho, Gary King & Jeffrey Segal, The
Supreme Court During Crisis:How War Affects Only Nonwar Cases, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1
(2005).
232. Kloppenberg, supra note 136, at 353.
233. Black, supra note 118, at 2.
234. See discussion supra Part III.C.
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Conclusion
The majority opinion in Seeger represented a deceptively united
front in favor of Justice Clark's opinion. Justices Goldberg, Black,
and Harlan wrote thorough concurring and dissenting opinions that
reached the pressing First Amendment issues that the majority
avoided. The customary reasoning for invoking the canon of
constitutional avoidance does not support the Court's decision in
Justice Clark's opinion represented an activist,
Seeger.
countermajoritarian decision which negated separation of power
concerns in an attempt to avoid addressing constitutional issues.
Including Justices Goldberg, Black, and Harlan's opinions would
have alerted the public to the delicate First and Fifth Amendment
issues at stake in Seeger, and provided a more accurate depiction of
the Court's decisionmaking process.
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